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Abstract
This paper expands the growing literature on common safe assets in
the context of the euro area financial system by employing credit risk
simulation techniques to investigate the properties of different safe asset
models and their impact on national bond markets. The paper explores in
particular the E-bonds model, whereby a supranational institution would
raise funds in the markets and provide bilateral senior loans to Member
States corresponding to a fixed proportion of GDP, complementing the
issuance of national government bonds, without risks of mutualisation.
The main findings are that E-bonds could reach a volume of 15 to 30%
of euro area GDP with a high degree of safety while becoming the ref-
erence safe asset for the banking sector, capital markets and monetary
policy operations in the euro area. As regards the impact on remaining
national bonds, such volumes would be consistent with Germany main-
taining its top credit rating. The average funding costs of Member States
would remain broadly stable, while marginal funding costs would tend to
experience limited increases, which should enhance market discipline.
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Executive Summary
Issuing a sufficient quantity of homogeneous and attractive European safe assets
would bring multiple benefits: it would reduce banks’ exposure to national
sovereign bonds, support a smooth and symmetric transmission of monetary
policy, bolster the functioning of, and facilitate progress towards completing
the Banking Union, create a benchmark for capital markets in Europe, buttress
the international role of the euro and, depending on the construction, strengthen
the incentives for sound national economic and budgetary policies.
Many proposals to create a safe asset made over the past decade assume a
Fiscal Union, whereby common issuance would be backed by joint and several
liabilities/guarantees from Member States, and the sharing of some national
fiscal competences to mitigate the risks of moral hazard. In some cases, the
instrument would help to finance deficit spending on common projects, making it
akin to a “safe liability”. Other proposals look at the question from a Financial
Union perspective, focusing on the “safe asset” side, that is how the current
supply of sovereign bonds in the euro area could be reorganised so that one
homogenous instrument of significant size could become the reference safe asset
for financial markets.
Previous studies looking at constructions that do not require joint and sev-
eral liabilities – and are hence compatible with the current EU legal framework
(namely, Article 125 TFEU) – suggest that E-Bonds have attractive features in
terms of safety, potential volume, liquidity, as well as of their impact on national
bond markets and incentives for responsible fiscal policies, that deserve careful
consideration in the ongoing discussions on deepening EMU.
This paper explores further the characteristics of “E-bonds”, whereby a
supranational institution would raise funds in the markets and provide bilat-
eral senior loans to Member States corresponding to the same proportion of
GDP in each Member State. Governments would use these funds to refinance
and replace a share of their maturing debt. With the appropriate calibration,
seniority of the loans would ensure that neither existing nor future liabilities of
any individual Member State would become liabilities of other Member States.
Equally, no joint guarantees from Member States would be required. Subordi-
nation to the senior bilateral loans would only apply to newly issued national
debt, implying therefore the grandfathering of existing sovereign debt.
Using multiannual data on sovereign CDS spreads and based on conservative
assumptions to calibrate a benchmark simulation model, this paper finds that
a common issuance of E-bonds could reach a volume of 15 to 30% of euro
area GDP (around AC 1.7 to 3.5 trillion) with a high degree of safety, including
as regards tail risks, and limited impact on national bond markets. Combining
low risk with large volumes, and covering all maturities, while remaining skewed
towards shorter-term ones, E-bonds could become the most liquid safe asset in
Europe, thereby transforming the landscape of financial markets and attracting
both European and foreign investors. The simulations in this paper indicate
that such a volume of E-bonds would barely affect Member States’ average
funding costs — with the exception of governments with low debt, who would
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see significant overall cost reductions. At the same time, it would improve
incentives for sound fiscal policies via the subordination of new national debt,
which would consequently see its yield (and hence the marginal cost of funding)
increase.
While there is clearly potential for higher volumes, it seems reasonable –
given the uncertainties surrounding the phasing-in process – to start with a
prudent approach and gradually expand the scheme size on the basis of ex-
perience. At 15% of euro area GDP and with issuance focused on short-term
maturities, E-bonds would already deliver important benefits for all participat-
ing Member States as they: (i) would likely enjoy top credit quality comparable
with the German bund whose triple-A credit rating would be preserved, (ii)
reinforce incentives for sounder policies within the EMU fiscal framework as the
marginal funding cost for high-debt countries would increase moderately, (iii)
generate a very liquid short-term market, which is currently underdeveloped in
the euro area when compared to the US, and (iv) become the reference safe
asset for the banking sector and monetary policy operations in the euro area.
As discussed in this paper, several positive dynamic and general equilibrium ef-
fects could materialise as the E-bonds volume approaches a critical mass. These
effects need further assessment but their materialisation could support the case
for further increasing the issuance size.
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1 Introduction
The case for a European safe asset
The case for a common European safe asset is increasingly being debated in
policy and academic circles. The proponents indicate that it could bring mul-
tiple benefits in the steady-state of a complete Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU).1
A common European safe asset could help sever the direct nexus between
banks and sovereigns, notably by lowering banks’ exposures towards national
bonds. In particular, a safe asset could increase the underlying diversification
while decreasing the credit risk of banks’ sovereign portfolios if the latter were
to reallocate proportionally their holdings of national bonds towards the com-
mon safe asset. In addition, it would also help to mitigate some of the risks and
negative feedback loops that operate via other (indirect) channels,2 including
monetary policy transmission and private sector risk-sharing via capital mar-
kets.
In effect, monetary policy operations are affected by the availability and
quality of safe assets. This important channel has grown in relevance in recent
years, given the increasing scarcity and asymmetry in the supply of highly credit-
rated sovereign debt in the euro area.3 These developments are thought to
hamper the smooth and symmetric transmission of euro area monetary policy,
including during periods of heightened market tensions, accentuating differences
in lending and borrowing conditions.4 A common European safe asset could
enhance the policy toolkit of the Eurosystem, notably by gradually establishing
a benchmark euro area yield curve5 and facilitating the conduct of both regular
open market operations and extraordinary asset purchases.
European capital markets would also benefit from a single risk-free rate curve
that could serve for asset valuation and contribute to more integrated capital
markets. Moreover, widespread holdings of this asset in the financial system
could reduce the negative effects of asymmetric flights to safety,6 including fi-
nancial instability, the tightening of financing conditions and the blunting of
monetary policy transmission. As summarised by Constaˆncio (2019), “Mone-
tary Union, Banking Union and Capital Markets Union are deeply intertwined.
1For instance, as indicated in European Commission (2017), a European safe asset defined
as a new financial instrument for the common issuance of debt, could reinforce integration
and financial stability. The more recent contributions by European Commission (2019a) to
the informal EU27 leaders’ meeting in Sibiu and by European Commission (2019b) to the
June 2019 Euro Summit stated that a European safe asset would be a beneficial stabilising
tool to complete EMU.
2See, e.g., Bellia et al. (2019) for a review of the different channels.
3See, e.g., Cœure´ (2019).
4See, e.g., Brand et al. (2019).
5See ECB (2014) and Nymand-Andersen (2018) for challenges in measuring the risk-free
yields in the euro area.
6For a discussion of capital flights and divergent market behaviour in sovereign bond mar-
kets during the first two decades of the Economic and Monetary Union, see Monteiro and
Vasˇ´ıcˇek (2019).
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A European safe asset is a linchpin of the three projects (...) None of them can
reach a smooth and full completion without it. Member States and European
policy makers must now take seriously the creation of such vital component of
the European financial architecture.”7
As a corollary, a common safe asset would also help to underpin the in-
ternational role of the euro.8 Without well-developed and integrated financial
markets, the euro may not reach its true potential in the global economic arena,
especially compared to the US dollar. Deep and broad financial systems are built
around publicly-issued and liquid safe assets, which contribute to an increased
demand for that currency among international investors.9
Importantly, as fiscal discipline is a key tenet of EMU, the introduction of
a common safe asset could improve incentives for responsible fiscal and eco-
nomic policies by increasing the marginal cost of debt issued individually by
governments, as in the E-bonds model. This could contribute to the envisaged
simplification of the current fiscal framework in EMU, complementing it with
more reliable and clearer market signals in response to fundamentals and policy
action by governments.
How to construct a European safe asset
While there is a broad recognition (but clearly not yet a consensus) on the
potential benefits of a European safe asset, there are widely different proposals
and views on how to achieve it. The different constructions display varying
emphasis on different characteristics. Figure 1 provides an indicative mapping
of the available design options, across the combined dimensions of liquidity,
financial stability, and shared governance on the one hand, and the implications
for market incentives and fiscal discipline on the other hand.10
Given the broad legal and political issues that are raised by constructions
that aim to fund new forms of public spending and/or entail mutualisation, the
debate has recently turned to models that aim to increase the supply of safe
assets in financial markets without mutualisation, with the objective of generat-
ing a common European benchmark and exploiting synergies in the refinancing
of existing national debt. From this perspective, this paper looks more closely
at the following constructions:11
7See also Lanno and Thomadakis (2019).
8See European Commission (2018b), which indicates that increasing the available pool of
euro-denominated assets with high credit rating would contribute to developing the European
financial sector and enhancing the global relevance of EU financial regulation and payment
systems. See also Leonard et al. (2019) calling for a European safe asset to support the
international role of the euro and as a basis for the Banking Union and the Capital Markets
Union.
9See IMF (2012), Laeven (2014), Golec and Perotti (2017) and McCauley (2019).
10In Figure 1, while estimates by Zettelmeyer and Leandro (2018) suggest that in terms of
possible volumes the SBBS and E-Bonds could be similar, their position on the vertical axis
is different as E-bonds would entail a higher degree of shared governance given their reliance
on a common issuer with a European institutional nature.
11Other interesting approaches, which however would not create a fully-fledged safe asset,
are:
8
Figure 1: Design options for a European safe asset
• Sovereign bond-backed securities (SBBS), which would consist of pooling
government bonds issued by euro area countries and tranching them into
senior and junior securities. The feasibility of this proposal was studied in
detail by the ESRB High-Level Task Force on Safe Assets (2018), based a
• Accountability bonds, which build on the concept of subordination of national debt to
increase incentives for sound fiscal policies through market discipline but do not entail
the creation of a common safe asset or provide a transition path towards it, and are
therefore not considered in this paper. See Fuest and Heinemann (2017).
• Purple bonds, which is a proposal for a 20-year transition towards a mutualised safe
asset (in the form of the Blue bond proposal referenced above). During this transition
period, the amount of national sovereign debt consistent with the Fiscal Compact’s
annual commitment (to reduce the excess general government debt above 60% of GDP
by 1/20 every year) would be labeled “Purple” and protected from debt restructuring
under a possible ESM programme. Purple bonds are not considered in this paper as
they do not directly entail the creation of a common safe asset and embed an element of
mutualisation. At the same time, they could provide a path for debt reduction towards
the 60% of GDP reference value which deserves consideration (including in combination
with the introduction of E-bonds) if the goal is to advance towards some form of Fiscal
Union, also not considered in this paper. See Smaghi and Marcussen (2018).
• ECB deposit certificates, which is a proposal that would see the ECB issuing tradable
certificates backed by the assets on its balance sheet. While these certificates would be
very safe, it would be difficult to deliver a continuous supply (it would rather be a one-
off operation) and to issue them with longer-term maturities. They would affect the
conduct of monetary policy and could exacerbate monetary dominance. However, they
could perhaps be part of a transition process. See Tonveronachi (2018) and Sandbu
(2019).
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proposal by Brunnermeier et al. (2017) (hereafter “B-et-al”) to introduce
European safe bonds (ESBies). In 2018, the European Commission pro-
posed an enabling framework to remove unwarranted regulatory obstacles
to the market-led development of SBBS.
• E-bonds, which would be issued by a public entity (a common issuer with
a European institutional nature) who would pass on the funding amounts
thus raised to Member States by granting them unconditional senior loans.
The use of seniority, combined with a size cap, would render the E-bonds
safe, resorting neither to securitisation, nor to mutualisation of debt (cur-
rent or future), nor to joint guarantees. First proposed in Monti (2010),12
they were featured under “Option 3” of European Commission (2011) as a
model to support common issuance backed by several but not joint guar-
antees. They were more recently studied by Zettelmeyer and Leandro
(2018) (hereafter “Z-L”), who come to the conclusion that E-Bonds have
attractive features in terms of safety, liquidity and incentives, and that
their potential size and attractiveness, as well as their impact on national
bond markets, deserve careful investigation.13
• Eurobills (without mutualisation) can be described as a variant of the
E-bonds model that would limit the maturity spectrum of the common is-
suance to short-term instruments. Eurobills, or E-bills, were first studied
by an expert group chaired by Tumpel-Gugerell et al. (2014) and further
developed by Bishop (2018). Leaving aside their mutualised forms (based
on joint liabilities), in this paper E-bills are considered as a short-term (ini-
tial) sub-set of E-bonds, constructed in the same manner as those, based
on the seniority of the loans from the common issuer to Member States.
While E-bills alone would not generate a full common yield curve,14 as
part of a broader process they could still deliver important benefits (see
Section 7).
Contributions from this paper
This paper provides additional perspectives on the credit risk properties of na-
tional bonds, SBBS and E-bonds, based on a review and recalibration of the
12E-bonds were also proposed by the then prime minister of Luxembourg, Jean-Claude
Juncker, and Italian minister of finance, Giulio Tremonti, in an op-ed in the Financial Times
in 2010, although their proposal was at that time misinterpreted as embedding mutualisation,
in the same way as Blue bonds. See Juncker and Tremonti (2010).
13Besides “Z-L”, also Bruegel recently advocated further research into the E-bonds model:
“In our view, E-bonds have many desirable properties, including that they are issued by a
true euro-area institution. But they raise the questions of whether the necessary contractual
arrangements and seniority would be respected by all sovereigns and would be enforceable,
and whether marginal funding costs would either become so expensive that fiscal stabilisation
policy becomes severely constrained at the margin or whether, on the contrary, marginal
funding would come down as rollover risks fall. The euro area should evaluate whether E-
bonds would work as intended.” See Demertzis et al. (2019).
14As explained in Constaˆncio (2019), issuing only short term paper would not serve the
panoply of important objectives sought from a European safe asset.
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models and assumptions used in the literature, and in particular of the contri-
butions by “B-et-al” and “Z-L” referenced earlier. The first part of the paper
reviews and updates the underlying assumptions based on empirical evidence,
including the full sample of available time series for credit default expectations.
This leads to a choice of probabilities of default and losses given default that,
while highly conservative, are more solidly grounded on the euro area’s historical
experience, on actual data on sovereign credit events and on industry practice.
Those assumptions are then used to recalculate the (average) credit risk prop-
erties of national bonds, SBBS and E-bonds that are used in the remainder of
this paper.
The paper then assesses the potential volume of a common safe asset built
using the SBBS or E-bond models. It shows that both models could reach
significant size and argues that previous studies might have underestimated
their potential.
The paper also advances a streamlined E-bond construction based on senior
loans, a single issuance cap and the participation of national debt management
offices in its governance structure. Credit risk simulations show that this stream-
lined E-bond construction could deliver (without mutualisation) a common safe
asset with sufficient volume and a credit worthiness equal to, or even greater
than, the current European benchmark, the German Bund. An additional ad-
vantage of this construction with a supranational common issuer is that it would
provide legal certainty on seniority – essentially as it would not be possible for
a Member State to change that aspect unilaterally.15
The paper also assesses quantitatively the impact of introducing E-bonds on
the remaining national bonds which would continue to be issued in parallel.16
The results confirm that the introduction of E-bonds would, ceteris paribus,
exert pressure on national bond yields. Such higher marginal funding costs
would have an important effect in the context of the evolving architecture of
EMU, as they would boost incentives for more prudent fiscal policies. At the
same time, average funding costs should remain broadly unchanged, hence not
impacting on Member States’ debt sustainability prospects. The paper shows
that the potential size of the E-bond issuance would not be constrained so much
by the credit risk of E-bonds themselves as by the wish to preserve the rating of
current triple-A issuers, or to contain the increase in the marginal cost of funding
for less creditworthy sovereigns. In particular, the increase on marginal costs
should not be excessive as that may create difficulties in terms of primary market
placement. Having this key concern in mind, the paper provides the elements
for conducting a possible calibration of the size of E-bonds that balances various
trade-offs in a prudent way.
To conclude, the paper illustrates the potential impact of creating a safe
asset such as E-bonds on financial markets and considers possible general equi-
15This would apply to the legal aspect of seniority. The question of a Member State that
decides not to respect such a legal obligation is discussed in Section 5.
16This exercise is relevant only for the E-bond model, as the risk transferred to the national
bond depends directly on the size of the E-bond issuance. For SBBS, the degree of credit risk
of the national bonds is unaffected by the size of the senior tranche of the SBBS.
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librium effects and transition elements. A comparison with the outstanding
volumes of debt securities issued by euro area countries shows that a relatively
small issuance of E-bonds could achieve sufficient scale and safety – similar to
those of Member States with the highest credit ratings – so as to become the
asset of reference in the euro area. A comparison with the maturity pattern of
US sovereign debt also shows the potential for making E-bonds the main gov-
ernment debt instrument in the euro area for maturities of less than two years.
Based on the current sovereign exposures of banks, insurers and pension funds,
conservative assumptions suggest that the introduction of E-bonds could deliver
visible benefits in terms of reducing banks’ exposure to national sovereign risk
and their degree of home bias.
2 Previous studies on the SBBS and E-bond
proposals
Brunnermeier et al. (2017) featured an analysis of the credit risk properties of
SBBS based on Monte Carlo simulations and a number of assumptions regarding
expected losses, probabilities of default and losses given default. Successive
exploratory work in this area has used this model and assumptions as reference,
including the work of the ESRB high-level task force on SBBS and the papers
by Zettelmeyer and Leandro, which used this simulation model as a basis for
comparing SBBS with other constructions, including E-Bonds.
The aforementioned methodology for analysing the credit risk of collater-
alised sovereign debt obligations based on Monte Carlo simulations is based on
a set of assumptions for:17
1. the probabilities of default (PD);
2. the losses given default (LGD);
3. how PDs and LGDs vary with three states of the economy, and
4. the probability of occurrence of those states (Prob).
Taken together, these parameters determine the expected losses for sovereign
i, as per the following formula, which takes into account PDs and LGD rates
over three states j of the business cycle:
ELi =
3∑
j=1
Probj × PDi,j × LGDi,j (1)
Typically, analysts set a conventional value for the LGD, and use PD es-
timates to determine the expected loss and, hence, the insurance premium to
cover it, as expressed by credit default swaps (CDS) spreads. “B-et-al” calibrate
17For convenience sake, in the following sections these assumptions are denoted as the “B-
et-al” assumptions.
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their parameters through the inverse operation, i.e., by taking CDS data as the
basis for inferring expected losses and PDs, which are used in turn for carrying
out simulations. The assumed LGD rates range from 20% for Germany to 95%
for Greece depending on the state of the economy (see Appendix A, Table 7).
3 A reassessment of baseline sovereign credit
risk
3.1 Using more solid (fuller evidence) assumptions
The risk parameters used in previous studies, specifically the PDs and LGDs for
each state of the economy, are set in a relatively simple manner, being subject
only to:
1. Monotonicity rules, according to which
i. higher PDs and LGDs correspond to worse states of the economy;
ii. within each state, higher PDs and higher LGDs correspond to lower
observed credit ratings;
2. A degree of consistency between average expected losses18 (or, possibly,
expected PDs) and sovereign CDS data observed in a particular month
(December 2015).19
As will be discussed, more solid, empirically-grounded assumptions seem ad-
visable for conducting an assessment of sovereign credit risks. While the static
nature of the simulation model carries intrinsic limitations, including as re-
gards the possibility of conducting point-in-time estimates, it provides an overall
framework for carrying out the simulations which readily allows for comparisons
with previous studies.20
As concerns the assumptions to be used for our simulations, a number of
questions appear pertinent. First, whether the choice of using December 2015
market data is appropriate to describe average sovereign credit risk in the euro
area. Second, whether the breakdown of average PDs and ELs into expansion
and recession scenarios (as well as the probability of these scenarios) is consistent
with the available data for the euro area. A third question relates to the chosen
LGD values, and whether they agree with the available evidence and industry
practice. In the remainder of this section, we address these questions in turn.
18Here and elsewhere, we mean by average expected losses the weighted average of the
expected losses in each state of the economy, as given by Equation 1.
19Consistency between average expected losses and sovereign CDS data applies only to the
benchmark calibration. When using the adverse calibration to stress test the benchmark
results, as in Appendix E, such consistency is lost.
20See also Appendix A which replicates the inference of the risk parameters in “B-et-al”.
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Sample period for CDS data and cyclical attributions
Previous studies relied on average expected losses inferred from sovereign CDS
spreads for a single data point, i.e., December 2015. This data point was as-
sumed to represent the central, or average, scenario, which is subsequently split
into three different scenarios (i.e., an expansion, a mild recession and a severe
recession) with different probabilities (respectively, 70%, 25% and 5%).
The general approach in this paper is to review the expected loss assumptions
using the entire available data for the euro area, thus capturing different periods,
including severe crises. Therefore, we (i) take the full sample of available CDS
data for the euro area Member States,21 and (ii) use the Centre for Economic
Policy Research (CEPR) business cycle chronology as a basis for classifying
recessions and expansions.22
To calculate average CDS spreads across the states of the economy, we rely
on evidence on cyclical developments in the euro area. Euro area recessions in
our sample correspond to those identified by the CEPR, namely the periods
running from (i) the second quarter of 2008 through to the second quarter of
2009 and (ii) the fourth quarter of 2011 through to the first quarter of 2013 (see
Figure 2). This corresponds to an average recession probability of 17% for the
CEPR sample over the period since the inception of the euro area, i.e., from
1999 to 2015. The recession probability for an aggregate of euro area countries
calculated based on the full available sample running from 1970 to 2015 is similar
(16%).
In line with the model structure, the recession periods are split into “mild”
and “severe”. The severe recession is assumed to correspond to the 12 months
from November 2011 to October 2012 which is the period when average CDS
spreads are highest in the sample (in excess of 600 bps).23 When considering
the full CEPR sample, the length of the subsample thus identified is broadly
in line with the “B-et-al” assumption according to which 1 in 6 recessions are
deemed severe. In keeping with this assumption, we split the 17% probability
21The CDS data used in this paper are mainly taken from Bloomberg and are based on the
ISDA 2014 definition, where available. For the sample start dates per country, see Table 1. As
in “B-et-al”, data on 5-year CDS contracts was collected in order to infer sovereign PDs over
a 5 year horizon. The Bloomberg CDS series, which run until November 2018, start no earlier
than 2004 but are extended backwards where possible using Markit data. Our sample start
dates thus range from 2001 to 2006, with the exception of Lithuania and Cyprus, which start
in 2009 and 2012, respectively. Later starting dates imply a relative bias in the calculations, as
the sample becomes more dominated by periods characterised by higher spreads. It should be
noted that such a bias works to increase the conservatism of the simulations for some countries
(in practice, those with smaller sovereign debt markets). Due to the absence of data, and as
in “B-et-al”, the CDS spreads for Luxembourg are set equal to those of the Netherlands, a
country with which it shares a AAA rating. Also due to the absence of data, the CDS spreads
for Malta are set to the average of those for Estonia and Lithuania, an approach motivated
by the fact that the credit ratings of Malta tended to evolve within the range of the ratings
for those two countries during our sample period.
22See https://cepr.org/content/euro-area-business-cycle-dating-committee.
23As such, the term “severe recession” does not necessarily refer to the period when the
decline in GDP was the greatest, but rather to the period when sovereign risk was perceived
as highest, on average.
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Figure 2: Euro area recessions and average sovereign CDS spreads
Note: shaded areas denote either a period of “mild” recession (grey) or of “severe”
recession (red).
Source: CEPR, Bloomberg, Markit, own calculations.
of a recession into a 14% probability of a mild recession and 3% probability of
a severe recession.24
Table 1 shows that the simple, full-sample average of CDS spreads are gener-
ally much higher than those for December 2015 used in the benchmark calibra-
tion of previous studies, and that the latter are generally closer to the average
spreads calculated for expansions (Greece constitutes a notable exception). This
highlights the fact that the approach of this paper obeys a high degree of con-
servatism as regards each of the three phases of the cycle.
This is a result of the fact that:
1. the severe recession is based on the worst period of the worst crisis since
the 1930s;
2. the mild recession covers periods of the Great Recession and of the euro
area sovereign debt crisis when CDS spreads and sovereign bond yields
reached unprecedentedly high levels;
3. the expansionary phase covers some post-crisis periods of strong market
turbulence.
24While the probabilities associated with the different states of the economy are less con-
servative in our simulations than those assumed by “B-et-al” based on data for the US, it
will be presently seen that our re-run of the simulations is based on overall more conservative
assumptions on average expected losses.
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Table 1: Average sovereign CDS spreads
Note: the sample ends in November 2018. Discrepancies between the sample start date
and the number of months in the sample are due to the fact that, for some countries,
CDS data is unavailable for some months.
Source: Bloomberg, Markit, own calculations.
It’s also worth noting that, in some cases, CDS spreads are not monotone
with respect to the overall state of the euro area economy, which is a consequence
of the empirical fact that national and euro area-wide cycles are not perfectly
synchronous.
Loss given default assumptions
As discussed earlier, the assumptions on both sovereigns’ PDs and LGDs are
crucial inputs to the credit risk simulations. In particular, once ELs have been
inferred from CDS data, the assumptions on LGDs govern the assumptions on
PDs, as per Equation 1 above.
It is clear from Equation 1 that, for a given EL, any bias in the LGD as-
sumptions implies an offsetting bias in the PD assumptions. Accurate credit risk
simulations thus require a careful choice of LGDs, which motivates a review of
available evidence from (i) market conventions, (ii) the regulatory framework,
(iii) banks’ own estimations, (iv) historical sovereign default episodes and (v)
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econometric methods.
The market convention for LGDs when pricing sovereign CDS contracts is
60%. For instance, Bloomberg’s street convention value for the recovery rate
(RR) for sovereign CDS is 40%. Given that RR is the complement of the LGD,
this means an LGD of 60%. IHS Markit, a provider of sovereign CDS data, also
supplies analysts with series for sovereign RRs. Again, the modal value of the
RR for euro area sovereigns is 40%, while deviations from this figure are found
to be only sporadic and comparatively small.
As regards the EU regulatory framework, Article 161(1)(a) of the Capital
Requirements Regulation sets a constant sovereign LGD of 45% for banks rely-
ing on regulator-provided LGDs under the “Foundation” Internal Ratings Based
(IRB) approach to credit risk weight calculation. Similarly, banks’ own estima-
tions can vary significantly, but average sovereign LGDs tend to be (well) below
60%, while estimates higher than this figure are comparatively rare. Bank-level
data also suggests that there is no clear correlation between estimated PDs and
LGDs. For a review of banks’ estimation of sovereign LGDs see Appendix B.
As regards historical default episodes, Moody’s (2017) provides an average
issuer-weighted LGD of 46% for the 1983-2016 period, which rises to 70% on a
value-weighted basis. Cruces and Trebesch (2013) construct a large dataset of
sovereign defaults and find that, for the full sample of 180 sovereign debt re-
structurings between 1978 and 2010, the average haircut was 37% (simple mean)
while the volume-weighted average haircut was lower, amounting to about 30%.
They also find that the ”Brady deals”, which put an end to the 1980s debt
crisis for 17 debtor countries, involved a high average haircut of 45%. This
exceeds the mean investor loss for the more recent subsample of 17 sovereign
bond restructurings since 1998 (39%). The type of debtor also matters. In par-
ticular, they find average haircuts of 87% in restructurings of highly indebted
poor countries. The average haircut in these 23 donor-supported restructurings
is nearly three times as large as for restructurings in middle-income countries.
One could expect that LGDs for vulnerable EA countries would be more com-
parable to the latter group, rather than to the former. Finally, the experience
of one of the largest haircuts ever recorded in absolute value terms, the unique
case of Greece’s private sector involvement in 2012, as analysed in Zettelmeyer
et al. (2013), shows that even under most distressful economic, financial and
fiscal conditions, the LGD is reckoned to have been approximately 65%.
As regards the inference of LGDs through econometric methods, Camba-
Mendez and Serwa (2016) use latent factor models to disentangle PDs from
LGDs based on the evolution of CDS spreads. Their results suggest that implicit
sovereign LGDs generally remained well below 60% between 2008 and 2012, and,
in all cases but one country, below 40%. Additionally, LGDs do not appear to
co-move systematically with PDs, meaning that changes in sovereign credit risk
translate essentially into changes in PDs.
Based on the previous review, it can be concluded that, while there is no
clear evidence for time variation, or state dependency of expected LGDs, it is
possible that they may mildly reflect debt levels and experience limited increases
in periods of systemic stress (much larger variations taking place in terms of
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PDs). Accordingly, it appears imprudent to assume very low LGDs for countries
which, at a given point in time, are experiencing low CDS spreads. In addition,
it can also be concluded that figures well above 60% for high income countries
lack empirical plausibility, even in times of distress. In particular, LGDs in
the range of 80% to 95% for some euro area countries in the severe recession
scenario, appear unhinged from available evidence. At the same time, this
implies a significant downward bias for inferred PDs.
In our credit risk simulations we therefore set an upper bound of 65% for
the LGDs, while generally imposing more conservative lower bounds. An upper
bound of 65% has the advantages of:
1. being appropriately conservative, reflecting the LGD of the Greek restruc-
turing (a historically high haircut under particularly unfavourable circum-
stances) and deep within the right tail of the distribution of LGD estimates
and realisations reviewed above, also taking account of the available evi-
dence of past defaults in higher-income countries;
2. not being unreasonably large, so as to not skew inferred PDs and be in-
congruent with the available evidence on LGD estimates and realisations;
3. broadly agreeing with conventional LGDs used when pricing CDS con-
tracts.
The LGD assumptions to be used in the simulations in this paper are shown
in Table 2 below. To introduce an additional source of variability, as in other
studies, LGDs in mild recessions are set equal to 80% of those in severe reces-
sions. In the expansionary scenario, LGDs are set equal to 2/3 of the LGDs in
a severe recession.25
3.2 Recalculating baseline expected losses for euro area
sovereigns
The final step involves recalculating the baseline sovereign expected losses un-
derpinning the new simulations shown in Section 5. Figure 3 plots the new EL
assumptions and compares them to the “B-et-al” assumptions.26 The former
are based on:
1. the new cycle identification and probabilities, based on CEPR data and
discussed above (see Figure 2);
2. the new LGD assumptions presented in Table 2; and
3. the new PDs extracted from the full sample of available CDS data, on the
basis of the new LGDs and the new cycles identified for the euro area.27
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Table 2: Alternative LGD assumptions
Source: own calculations.
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Figure 3: Expected losses using fuller-evidence vs “B-et-al” assumptions
(a) Expected losses under expansion (b) Expected losses under mild recessions
(c) Expected losses under severe recession (d) Average 5-year expected losses
Source: Brunnermeier et al. (2017), Bloomberg, Markit, own calculations.
As can be observed, the expected losses in the expansion scenario resulting
from the fuller-evidence assumptions are generally rather conservative as they
are partly based on some post-crisis periods characterized simultaneously by
euro-area wide expansions and strong market turbulence. Also, these assump-
tions lead to non-zero expected losses during expansions, even for the most
creditworthy euro area countries and the pre-crisis period.28
At the opposite end, in the severe recession scenario, the fuller-evidence
assumptions produce less extreme results for the least creditworthy countries.29
The picture is more mixed in the mild recession scenario. In this case, the
25Overall, this leads to higher average LGDs for twelve countries and lower LGDs for seven
countries, compared to “B-et-al”.
26See also Appendix C for the exact figures.
27As mentioned in Appendix A, in the absence of information on the original inference
method in “B-et-al”, the 5-year PDs for sovereign i in month t were derived from average
monthly CDS spreads using a simplified formula employed by practitioners according to which
PDi,t = 1− e
(−T×CDSi,t/LGDi,t)
where T represents the number of years of the CDS contract (i.e., 5). The expected losses
shown in Figure 3 are then given by ELi,t = PDi,t × LGDi,t.
28By contrast, the “B-et-al” assumptions imply zero 5-year expected losses for five Member
States during expansions, and otherwise very low expected losses for several other countries.
29To a lesser extent, the “B-et-al” assumptions also tend to be pessimistic for other Member
States less severely affected by the crisis, with the notable exceptions of Austria, Germany,
Luxembourg and the Netherlands.
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expected losses resulting from the fuller-evidence assumptions may be either
less or more favourable, compared with the previous studies.30
The next sections of the paper rely on the recalculated sovereign credit risk
to assess risk premia changes in government bond markets brought about by the
issuance of a safe asset, whether on private initiative, as in the case of SBBS,
or by a public entity, as in the case of E-bonds. But, before doing that, Section
4 elaborates on how E-bonds could be designed.31
4 A simple design for E-bonds
A possible European safe asset ought to comply with the existing legal frame-
work of the TFEU, namely the non-mutualisation of national debt, also to gather
sufficient political support. One option to achieve a sufficient degree of safety for
the common safe asset while avoiding joint guarantees and risk mutualisation
would be through the subordination of all national debt to the loans received
from the common issuer of the European safe asset. Member States would
use the received funds to replace existing debt. Subordination of national debt
would only apply to debt issued after the launch of E-Bonds (grandfathering).
European Commission (2011) indicated that issuance backed by credit en-
hancements such as seniority of the issuer’s claims would be compatible with
the EU Treaties. The compatibility of E-Bonds with the EU Treaties was also
indirectly confirmed by the European Court of Justice in its “Pringle” judgment
in 2012. In effect, under E-bonds, Member States would remain individually re-
sponsible for their commitments to their creditors and the conditions attached
to the loans from the common issuer (i.e. the obligation to grant them senior-
ity) should prompt Member States to implement sound budgetary policies.32
Should the European Stability Mechanism (ESM)33 assume the role of the com-
mon issuer of E-bonds, it would neither be a guarantor of, nor assume the debts
of, participating Member States.34
30In particular, the expected losses under “B-et-al” are noticeably more pessimistic for
Greece, Portugal and Italy, but are markedly more optimistic for Estonia, Ireland, Latvia and
Malta.
31The design of SSBS has already been carefully studied as regards its economic and legal
aspects in ESRB High-Level Task Force on Safe Assets (2018) and in European Commission
(2018a), including the accompanying impact assessment. Hence, this paper will not elaborate
further on that construction.
32According to paragraph 137 of the “Pringle” Judgment: “Article 125 TFEU does not
prohibit the granting of financial assistance by one or more Member States to a Member State
which remains responsible for its commitments to its creditors provided that the conditions
attached to such assistance are such as to prompt that Member State to implement a sound
budgetary policy.” See European Court of Justice (2012).
33The common issuer could be e.g. the ESM, the EIB, the Commission or a new suprana-
tional entity. Savona (2019) suggested recently it should be the ESM.
34According to European Court of Justice (2012), paragraph 138: “(...) the ESM will not
act as guarantor of the debts of the recipient Member State. The latter will remain responsible
to its creditors for its financial commitments.” Paragraph 139 adds: “The granting of financial
assistance (...) in the form of loans (...) in no way implies that the ESM will assume the debts
of the recipient Member State. On the contrary, such assistance amounts to the creation of
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The seniority of the loans granted by the common issuer to Member States
could be legally ensured in various (possibly complementary) forms, such as
(i) an inter-governmental agreement, (ii) a specific “seniority” clause in the
loan contract and (iii) a “subordination” clause in (new) national bond con-
tracts.35 The legal setup should be constructed to avoid the possibility of uni-
lateral changes by any Member State, which would be achieved through the
use of bilateral loan contracts mentioned under point (ii), and also by ensur-
ing that the intergovernmental agreement and the loan contract are not under
the national jurisdiction of that Member State. The specific legal details and
operational features would need, however, further analysis.36
The interest payments on the loans from the common issuer could be ar-
ranged either directly – Member States would pay interest directly to the com-
mon issuer – or indirectly through the EU budget. In the latter case, each Mem-
ber State would pay an additional contribution to the EU budget to cover the
interest that it owes on its loans and the EU would then transfer those amounts
to the common issuer. In this manner, the credibility of interest-payment flows
would benefit from the regularity of the established EU budgetary contribution
process, complementing the seniority of the loans.37 38
Total loans would represent approximately the same proportion of GDP
for each Member State. Hence, total E-Bond issuance would approximately
amount to that same proportion also in terms of overall euro area GDP.39 In this
respect, the model of E-bonds considered in this paper deviates somewhat from
the simulations run by “Z-L”, which, for easier comparison with SBBS, apply a
more complex “purchase rule” to keep portfolio weights close to the ECB capital
key and to preserve a minimum volume of national issuance40 even for countries
a new debt, owed to the ESM by that recipient Member State, which remains responsible for
its commitments to its creditors in respect of its existing debts. It should be observed in that
regard that (...) any financial assistance (...) must be repaid to the ESM by the recipient
Member State and (...) the amount to be repaid is to include an appropriate margin.”
35Applying subordination only to new bond issuances after a given date would avoid legal
issues as concerns currently outstanding sovereign debt.
36See Section 8 for a discussion on how to avoid potential losses in case a Member State
does not respect its obligations towards the common issuer.
37Member States’ contributions to the EU budget have never been missed since the creation
of the European Union in 1958. It is to be noted that should available funds be insufficient to
make a payment from the EU budget (in this case, to the common issuer), the Commission
is empowered under EU legislation to collect the necessary cash from Member States, and to
sanction any Member State that may be in arrears.
38Another potential upside of this approach could arise if the interest paid by the common
issuer were to be lower than the related interest payments by Member States to the EU budget
- in this case consideration could be given to using the excess to fund other activities. This
could create resources for a euro area budget, directly generated by a common initiative of
euro area Member States.
39Some smaller Member States currently have very low levels of debt meaning that maximum
issuance under E-bonds could fall below the common threshold in those cases.
40This is possible thanks to the different nature of the construction. Under the SBBS
model, the issuer operates autonomously, purchasing debt securities on primary or secondary
markets. It is therefore important to set purchase limits on the SBBS operator so that it does
not disrupt (primary and secondary) markets and the activities of national debt management
offices.
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with a debt-to-GDP ratio below the target size of the E-bonds. However, in
the case of E-bonds there is no need to preserve minimum national issuance
and geographical diversification of the underlying bond portfolio plays less of a
role in the credit quality of E-bonds, compared with SBBS. In particular, there
seems to be no counter-indication to having low-debt countries issuing their
entire debt through E-bonds, given these countries’ low credit risk.41
In terms of governance, Member States would play a driving role in the com-
mon issuance of E-bonds. First, they would set the cap on the initial volume
of E-bonds that may be issued and the main elements of the transition, as well
as any further increases to that maximum volume, depending on the success of
the scheme. These decisions would need to be taken at a high political level
in view of their market and political impact. Second, for the issuance strat-
egy and its operation, national debt management offices (DMOs) could play a
central role as part of a board establishing the maturity profile, the ticket sizes
and the schedule of issuances, having in mind the possible repercussions on
the functioning of national bond markets and seeking ways to complement the
European and national issuance strategies. Reflecting this governance and the
public nature of this endeavour, the funding advantage enjoyed by the common
issuer, from higher liquidity and lower credit risk premia, would be transferred
to Member States, net of any agreed fees (as discussed in Section 8). Moreover,
participation could be open to EU Member States outside the euro area, pro-
vided that they assume the exchange rate risk of borrowing in euros from the
common issuer.
5 New simulation results for SBBS and E-Bonds
This section presents new simulation results for the SBBS and E-bond models
of safe assets based on the recalculated assumptions.
Sovereign bond-backed securities (SBBS)
We begin by focusing on senior and junior SBBS (ESBies and EJBies), compar-
ing simulation results from using the original assumptions of the benchmark cal-
ibration of “B-et-al” and the fuller-evidence assumptions described in Section 3
of this paper.42 Figure 4 shows the expected losses on ESBies and EJBies based
on the fuller-evidence and “B-et-al” assumptions, per subordination level and
based on the original portfolio weights of “B-et-al”. As can be observed, ESBies
are safer at all levels of subordination under the fuller-evidence assumptions
41Therefore, the lack of subordination enhancing the claim towards these countries should be
largely irrelevant in the overall economy of the E-bonds. Moreover, E-bonds would eliminate
the liquidity risks to which the holders of national bonds issued by small Member States with
low debt levels are currently exposed.
42In the benchmark calibration, the model relies on the PDs and LGDs discussed in Section
3, with cross-country correlations arising only from the common cyclical position. This sce-
nario is subject to stress testing in Appendix E based on the adverse calibration. The latter
leads to an increase in both PDs and cross-country correlations.
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Figure 4: 5-year expected losses on ESBies and EJBies, per subordination level
(a) ESBies (b) EJBies
Source: Own calculations.
when compared with the benchmark calibration of “B-et-al”. The difference
springs from the more realistic LGDs and recession probabilities used in this
paper, as well as from the fact that the original CDS data for December 2015
seem to produce an excessively pessimistic central scenario for some countries
(e.g., Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece) when compared with the full available
sample of CDS data.
The risk profile of EJBies is similar under both set of assumptions for most
subordination levels. However, for lower levels of subordination (below 25%),
EJBies are reckoned as discernibly riskier under the fuller-evidence assumptions.
This is due to the more conservative PDs, particularly for the most creditworthy
sovereigns. Given that the proposal for SBBS envisaged by ESRB High-Level
Task Force on Safe Assets (2018) involved an EJB tranche of 10% together with
a mezzanine tranche of 20%, the 6 percentage points increase in the expected loss
of EJBs at a 10% level of subordination under the fuller-evidence assumptions
highlights possible unrecognised risks. Conversely, as regards the mezzanine
tranche, expected losses are seen to drop from 3.8% to 1.2% under the fuller-
evidence assumptions. It is worth noting that an expected loss on ESBies of
less than 0.5%43 can be reached with subordination levels as low as 8%. This
is half the figure than that under the “B-et-al” assumptions, which required
a subordination level of at least 16%. What is more, if the expected loss for
Germany is taken as the safe-asset benchmark, then a subordination of 5% is
enough for ESBies to reach a safe asset status under these simulations.44
43“B-et-al” take 0.5% as the safety benchmark, a figure that corresponds to the expected
loss for Germany under their adverse calibration.
44It should be noted that the full sample-based average expected loss for Germany stands
at 1.06%, which is significantly higher than the 0.14% figure exogenously set in the original
assumptions. The fact that the expected loss for Germany is estimated at 1.06% should be
understood in relative terms, in comparison with the results for other countries, rather than
as a definite measure of the average credit risk of Germany. In fact, this comparatively high
figure is a consequence of a number of factors, including the influence of the crisis periods on
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In the ESRB report, considering the need to preserve liquidity in national
sovereign markets and to avoid disturbing the operations of DMOs, a size of AC
1.5 trillion or more was identified for SBBS.45 “Z-L” estimate a larger potential
size and the calculations in this paper point in a similar direction. However,
the schedule and homogeneity of senior SBBS depends on the demand for the
junior securities, which may falter in periods of distress. A question that merits
consideration is whether the size of the junior tranche and the implicit level of
subordination may have to be larger than previously reckoned to avoid risks to
the supply of senior SBBS in such times, which would lower the potential size
of senior SBBS in practice.46
Senior loans from a common issuer (E-bonds)
Turning now to an assessment of E-bonds, Figure 5 shows that, based on the
benchmark scenario and the fuller-evidence assumptions, ELs for E-Bonds are
negligible up to relatively high levels of GDP. These ELs are much lower for most
volumes in percentage of GDP than those calculated in “Z-L”.47 In particular,
the sample and the simplified nature of the formulae used to derive PDs and ELs from CDS
spreads.
45As argued in ESRB High-Level Task Force on Safe Assets (2018), “given current volumes of
outstanding debt, the maximum SBBS market size could be set at EUR 1.5 trillion or more,
depending on liquidity conditions. With an issuer limit of 33%, for example, a reasonable
steady-state size of the SBBS market would be EUR 1.5 trillion. (...) Although a higher
issuer limit would allow the SBBS market to grow beyond this level, it might accentuate
concerns regarding sovereign bond market liquidity, notwithstanding the positive spillover
effects of greater SBBS market liquidity. An SBBS market of EUR 1.5 trillion is expected to
have a limited negative impact on sovereign bond market liquidity.”
46To prevent the junior tranche from becoming too risky, the composition of the underlying
portfolio could be changed, excluding countries in or close to default. However, this could
reduce the homogeneity (and liquidity) of both senior and junior SBBS. Moreover, any possible
reduction or interruption in the issuance of the junior tranche (for instance due to insufficient
demand in times of stress) would have the same effect on the issuance of the senior tranche, as
both tranches are issued together. This could possibly undermine the markets’ perception of
the senior tranche as a safe asset, for a truly European safe asset should be available in high
quantities especially in periods of financial distress. For these reasons, European Commission
(2017) presented the SBBS as an instrument to increase the supply of safe assets and promote
diversification in banks’ balance sheets, while putting forward the European safe asset as a
separate concept and as a medium-term policy option.
47The E-bond scheme sizes presented in this subsection are based on issuance rules whereby
Member States issue E-bonds up until a given percentage of GDP is reached, beyond which
they are required to issue national bonds. The calculations assume that both government
securities and central government loans can be potentially replaced by loans from the central
issuer, and thus enter into the E-bonds scheme. The calculations also assume that these
forms of debt can be subordinated to E-bonds. At the same time, non-central government
loans are assumed to be neither replaceable nor subject to subordination. Given the different
debt ratios of Member States (i) a common GDP-based issuance rule implies different levels
of subordination for different countries and (ii) the implied E-bond portfolio weights are
closely related to the GDP shares of participating Member States but may deviate from them
as the E-bond issuance in some countries is capped by their low debt levels. In order to
improve consistency with the underlying credit risk model, the implied subordination levels
were calculated as weighted averages based on debt series covering the same time span and
relying on the same cycle probabilities as for the CDS data described in Section 3.
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Figure 5: 5-year expected losses on E-bonds
Source: Own calculations.
a 5-year expected loss below 0.5% can be enjoyed by E-bonds of a size of up to
39% of GDP. This is much higher than the 23% computed using the assumptions
from previous studies.48 In addition, using a safety level equal to the average
historical ELs inferred for Germany as a reference, E-bonds would be safer
than that benchmark for any issuance size up to approximately 47% of GDP.
Alternatively, one can use as a threshold for a safe asset status the highest EL
among Member States that either currently enjoy a AAA rating (Germany, the
Netherlands and Luxembourg), or that have retained a AAA rating throughout
most of the sample period used in the model calibration, while currently enjoying
a AA+ rating (Austria and Finland). This latter benchmark corresponds to the
EL for Austria (1.71%). Under the AT benchmark, issuance could be expanded
to volumes up to 60% of GDP, indicating that E-bonds could enjoy a high degree
of safety for total issuances amounting to high levels of euro area GDP.
Another important metric for assessing the riskiness of E-bonds is the value-
at-risk (VaR), which considers the tail risks associated with particularly severe
losses. Figure 6 displays the VaR of E-bonds for different issuance sizes, based
on simulations using the fuller-evidence assumptions. As can be observed, when
E-bond issuance corresponds to 20% of GDP, the VaR is negligible, even for very
low quantiles (with the maximum loss estimated at less than 1%).
By increasing issuance size to 30% of GDP, the VaR remains generally very
low, only rising noticeably when considering the far end of the loss distribution
(the quantiles below 1%), but to contained levels, even in the case of an im-
plausibly remote (“black-swan”) systemic event whereby all euro area countries
48The reasons for the difference in assessed expected losses are similar to those mentioned
above when discussing ESBies.
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Figure 6: Value-at-risk of E-bonds per issuance size
Note: solid lines represent the VaR of E-Bonds, for different scheme sizes. The dashed
line represents the model-based VaR for Germany, for comparison purposes. The VaR
for the 0% quantile represents the maximum possible losses. Based on the fuller-
evidence assumptions.
Source: Own calculations.
default. It can be seen, furthermore, that the intrinsic diversification enjoyed
by E-bonds allows the scheme to achieve lower tail risks than those implicit for
Germany – one of the safest countries in our sample – even at volumes as high
as 50% of GDP, when focusing on the lower quantiles of the loss distribution.
Overall, the simulations under the fuller-evidence assumptions suggest that the
tail risks of E-bonds are significantly lower than previously reckoned under the
benchmark scenario. Appendix E presents stress tests for these simulations,
which prove to be relatively robust.
6 Impact of E-Bond issuance on national bonds
Expected losses (ELs)
While the previous section showed that E-bonds would be extremely safe up to
very large sizes in terms of euro area GDP, its design (based on seniority) is such
that the larger its volume the stronger the pressure on the credit rating, price
and liquidity of national bonds. This effect can constrain the level of common
issuance that may be deemed acceptable and is analysed quantitatively in this
section. Table 3 presents the expected losses of (remaining) national bonds for
various levels of common E-bond issuance.
Before discussing the impact of E-bonds on national bonds, it is worth focus-
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Table 3: Expected losses on national bonds (in %) per E-bond issuance size (as a %
of GDP)
Note: based on the fuller-evidence assumptions; the last row shows the EL on E-bonds;
a blank figure denotes a situation where the E-bond scheme size exceeds the amount
of eligible sovereign debt outstanding as of year-end 2017, so that no national bonds
are issued.
Source: Own calculations.
28
ing on the first column in Table 3, which shows the average ELs for individual
Member States resulting from the fuller-evidence assumptions discussed in Sec-
tion 3. ELs start from approximately 1% for the “safest” countries (Germany
and Finland) and reach around 15-18% for Cyprus and Greece. Compared to
the ELs in previous studies (see Appendix D), the ones presented in this paper
are higher for the most creditworthy countries and, in some cases, lower for the
less creditworthy ones.49 As expected, Table Table 3 confirms that the credit
risk of national bonds increases with the size of E-bonds.
Government funding costs
Given the characteristics of E-bonds, one should distinguish between the in-
crease in the cost of government funding via national bonds, what would usually
be “marginal funding costs”, and the “average funding costs”, which would be
the weighted average of (i) the funding costs associated with national bonds, (ii)
the costs on the loans received from the common issuer and, possibly, (iii) those
on other forms of debt, such as borrowing by the non-central government. For
simplicity, it is assumed that the interest rate charged by the common issuer on
its loans to Member States would reflect the interest rate paid (on average) by
this institution on its E-bonds.
Table 4 computes these costs using the model and assumptions described
in previous sections. The last row of the table presents the risk premia that
E-bonds would command for different sizes of common issuance. It shows that
for issuances up to 15-20% of GDP, E-bonds would be basically riskless and pay
no risk premium. This premium would only marginally increase afterwards and
reach the average risk premium implied for German debt (21 bps) only when
the E-bond issuance reaches 45-50% of GDP.
49It should be noted that, as expected losses are generally higher in our simulations, the
safety benchmark (corresponding to the expected losses on the bonds for Germany, the Nether-
lands, Luxembourg or Austria which enjoy(ed) a AAA rating in our sample) has also been
shifted upwards compared to “B-et-al”.
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Table 4: Increase in credit risk premia of national bonds (in bps) per E-bond issuance size (as a % of GDP of the euro area and each
Member State)
Note: based on the fuller evidence assumptions; the first column shows the national (average) credit risk premia in the absence of
E-bonds; the last row shows the (average) credit risk premia on E-bonds; a blank figure denotes a situation where the E-bond scheme
size exceeds the amount of eligible sovereign debt as of year-end 2017, so that no national bonds are issued.
Source: Own calculations.
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Table 4 also shows the estimated increase in the risk premia of national bonds
for various sizes of E-bond issuance, compared to their average credit risk under
the current situation where no E-bonds are issued.50 To do so, it first identifies
the average credit risk premia that a country would pay on the junior debt
that it issues directly, measured with respect to the risk-free rate and based
on the full CDS sample period. This is reported in the first the column, “0%
(no E-bonds)”. At 40% of GDP – and taking the “static” and “average” risk
premia view of the simulation model – several countries would see their premia
increase to more than 100 bps (and by almost 250 bps, in the case of Cyprus).
For larger E-bond volumes, the simulations show that the situation on national
bond markets could become rather challenging for a number of Member States.
By contrast, with common issuance at 15-20% of GDP, spreads would increase
only moderately. The increase in marginal cost of funding would be within a
few dozen bps and, in any case, below 100 bps for most countries (with only
Latvia and Lithuania experiencing higher rates as subordinated national debt
would be very thin).
However, while subordinating national bonds to E-bonds would increase the
marginal funding costs of sovereigns, as shown in Table 4, this would be mostly
offset by lower interest rates paid on the senior loans. Table 5 shows the average
credit risk premia paid by euro area countries on all of their outstanding debt.51
It indicates that, for an E-bond issuance worth 15-20% GDP, nearly all countries
would pay on average the same funding costs as currently, with some low debt
countries paying noticeably less.52 Most countries with lower ratings would pay
on average less than now to fund their debt. However, as seen in Table 4, this
would be accompanied by additional market pressure, as the marginal cost of
issuing national bonds would be higher.
50The change in risk premia was calculated based on a simplified, risk-neutral formula,
according to which ∆ CDS spread = ∆EL
T
. Average credit risk is determined by the average
expected losses calibrated under the recalculated assumptions, as reported in Appendix C.
51For countries with low debt levels, the average credit risk premia would quickly diminish
and converge to the risk premia paid by E-bonds, as they would increasingly and then fully
fund themselves via the common issuer. For countries with low debt, say as low as 20%
like Luxembourg, the premia goes down to zero, and then increases slightly as larger E-bond
issuances carry an additional risk; this occurs notwithstanding the fact that the amount of
loans granted by the common issuer does not change (e.g., it corresponds to the totality of
the Luxembourgian debt).
52For countries with low levels of debt, the average credit risk premia presented in Table
5 fall very significantly with the introduction of E-bonds. This is due to E-bonds funding
a large proportion of their total government debt and carrying much lower credit risk than
national sovereign bonds. The fall in funding costs is the largest when the volume of E-bonds
reaches the total volume of national debt (e.g.: for EE from 5% of GDP, LU from 10%, LV
from 20%, and LT from 30%). However, for larger volumes of E-bonds, this funding advantage
would be partly offset, as E-bonds would start to carry more risk. In terms of incentives for
responsible fiscal behaviours, the cost of funding an extra euro of debt would be very low for
these countries, as long as their total volume of debt remains below the E-Bond threshold.
However, it would rise significantly (see Table 4 ) if the country would issue that extra euro
of debt directly in the market, given subordination. This threshold effects could be seen as a
strong commitment device to contain fiscal deficits and avoid increasing debt, with a “lock-in”
effect once the country reduces the debt to lower levels in % of GDP than the size of E-Bonds
issuance.
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Table 5: Changes in average credit risk premia on total government debt (in bps) per E-bond issuance size (as a % of GDP of the euro
area and each Member State)
Note: average credit risk premia on total government debt is the weighted average of the premia paid indirectly on E-bonds issuance
(via the senior loan) and of the premia paid on the remaining national debt (the junior part of which is show in Table 4). The first
column shows the national (average) credit risk premia in the absence of E-bonds. The columns show the average cost for the totality of
outstanding debt of a country for a given E-bonds issuance threshold. Risk premia on ineligible debt (i.e., non-central government loans)
is assumed not to change with respect to the situation of no E-bonds.
Source: Own calculations.
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With an E-bond issuance of 40% of GDP, Germany, France and Italy would
see their average funding costs increase slightly, with many countries in the
middle range of the creditworthiness scale seeing important reductions, implying
some redistribution in favour of smaller Member States. At the same time,
with such a sizable E-bonds scheme, the potential for significant macroeconomic
benefits is also larger. On the whole, Tables 4 and 5 provide reassurance on the
viability of issuing E-bonds for an amount of 15-20% of GDP and an indication
of the trade-offs involved for larger sizes.
Overall supply of highly safe assets in the euro area
The impact on the creditworthiness of national bonds is relevant for identifying
the changes in the overall supply of safe assets in the euro area. The total supply
of safe assets (highly rated sovereign and supranational debt securities) depends
not only on the volume of E-bonds but also on the evolution of the credit risk
of national bonds, which would rise. In Figure 7, a horizontal line indicates
the current volume of AAA-rated sovereign bonds in the euro area (circa AC
1.9 trillion outstanding issued by Germany, the Netherlands and Luxembourg).
This amount is compared with the overall volume of AAA assets that could be
achieved by adding up the volume of E-bonds and national bonds that would
remain highly safe. These are the countries whose expected loss remains below a
threshold indicating AAA safety, which is set to the expected loss for Austria.53
As mentioned, the credit risk of currently-rated AAA bonds would increase
with the E-bond size and the related subordination of national debt. As can be
observed also in Figure 7, for an E-bond issuance equivalent to 15% of GDP, the
pool of assets considered safe in the euro area would increase to approximately
AC 2.7 trillion, which represents a 44% increase with respect to the current out-
standing amount. At 20% of GDP, this figure rises to approximately 3.1 million,
or a 64% increase. However, as E-bonds grow larger than 20% of GDP, Ger-
man bonds may lose their AAA-rating, which explains the marked drop in AAA
assets observed in the chart.54
Further increases in E-bond issuance would “extract” and centralise safety
from all other national bonds and central government debt, while also rendering
the latter more liquid via E-bond issuance. This would offset the drop from the
loss of AAA status of the Bund, and then push the safe asset pool to even
larger sizes.55 It remains to be seen if general equilibrium effects could avoid
the kink around 20% of GDP, and allow German bonds to remain AAA-rated
53As previously mentioned, it should be noted that Austria, a modest player in the euro
area sovereign debt market, retained a AAA rating throughout most of the sample period
used for calibrating our model.
54A smaller kink can be observed at a common issuance of around 10% of GDP as the credit
risk for Dutch and Luxembourgian bonds pass the AAA safety threshold.
55“Z-L” look at the possible rating implications for the whole set of countries. A similar
exercise in this context would require re-basing the reference EL threshold for levels other
than AAA. It can be assumed however that shift in rating category would happen similarly
to those indicated in “Z-L”.
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Figure 7: Safe asset volumes per E-bond issuance size
Note: current amounts based on AAA sovereign bonds as of year-end 2017 (that
is, issued by Germany, the Netherlands and Luxembourg); amounts under E-bonds
are based on Austria’s EL threshold; the dashed line shows the maximum achievable
amount if all remaining national debt can be subordinated to the loans from the central
issuer.
Source: Own calculations.
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(see Section 9).56
This analysis shows a broadly linear increase in the supply of safe assets in
the euro area as E-bond issuance is raised to at least 20% of GDP. As will be
discussed in the next section, E-bond amounts in the range of 15% to 20% of
GDP should be sufficient to render it a very relevant, if not the main, asset in
euro area financial markets. Going beyond that volume seems entirely possible,
but the scope for doing so would depend not so much on the creditworthiness
of German bonds, which would remain high in any case, but on the possible
impact on more vulnerable countries.
With common issuance at 15-20% of GDP, the expected losses on the remain-
ing debt of high debt countries would increase relatively little. This is because
subordination levels remain very high, meaning that the credit risk shifted away
to the senior claim is spread over a large base of remaining national bonds. For
countries with low or modest levels of national debt, ELs can instead increase
quite rapidly, as risks concentrate on a thin slice of debt. The impacts on risk
premia and overall funding costs are discussed below. Needless to say, these
calculations do not take explicitly into account the overall risk reduction from
introducing a common safe asset in the euro area, which is expected to have a
beneficial impact on the overall credit worthiness of all participating countries.
For a common issuance on the higher side of a plausible range, i.e., at 40% of
GDP, Table 3 shows that several countries may no longer need to issue national
debt securities (e.g., Luxembourg and the three Baltic countries). For others,
the increase in “marginal” credit risk could become substantial.
7 Analysis of volumes, maturities and holdings
The simulations in the previous sections suggest that prudent levels of common
issuance through E-Bonds, in the range of 15% to 30% of GDP, would carry
very low credit risk, and hardly impact average funding costs of Member States,
while having a limited effect on the marginal cost of funding, thus improving
incentives for prudent fiscal policies. This section puts this issuance size into
perspective, compared to the volumes of remaining national bond markets and
to the current sovereign exposures of banks, insurers and occupational pensions
funds.
Replacement of national markets
As mentioned earlier, the E-bond issuer would grant loans to Member States up
to a pre-defined limit, expressed as the same percentage of GDP for all Member
States (see Figure 8). In other words, if the maximum volume of E-bond issuance
56In addition, if the whole of government debt (rather than only securities and central
government loans) could be made subordinated to E-bonds, this kink would be avoided at
20% of GDP (and encountered at higher values). In addition, given the experience of the
US, which do not enjoy a AAA rating from all main credit rating agencies, it is questionable
whether the kink would actually materialise in such terms.
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Figure 8: Replacement of central government debt securities by E-bonds across Mem-
ber States
Note: based on the existing stock of listed central government debt securities issued
by euro area Member States as at early 2019.
Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg data.
is set at 15% of euro area GDP, each and every Member State would be able to
receive funding from the common issuer up to a maximum 15% of their GDP.
This means that (i) the lower the GDP of any given Member State, the lower the
absolute amount of funding accessible to it through the E bond Issuer and (ii)
the larger the stock of national debt, the higher the coefficient of subordination.
As a result, a large market for the common safe asset would gradually de-
velop and reduce national markets accordingly. In the case of Member States
with low debt levels debt issuance would be made exclusively through the com-
mon issuer.57 Using recent data on listed debt securities issued by the central
governments of euro area countries, an E-bond issuance amounting to 15% of
euro area GDP would deliver a common safe asset of approximately AC 1.7 tril-
lion, already 54% larger than the current stock of listed debt securities issued
by the German federal government (approximately 1.1 trillion).
57Hence, there is an incentive for Member States with small debt levels to shift all or most
of their funding operations to the common issuer, provided their debt remains within the
general debt-to-GDP cap applying to all Member States. For some smaller countries, which
may find that their debt levels slightly exceed the common threshold, it is already the case
that they are facing liquidity issues on primary markets. They would likely make recourse to
national issuance in only a few occasions (and for specific maturities which carry the most
attractive funding costs), to reach the minimum ticket size.
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Figure 9: Short-term and longer-term government debt securities in the euro area and
the US
Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg data.
Choice of maturity pattern and market impact
When exploring the possible maturity profile of E-bond issuance, it is useful to
consider the existing profiles of potential participating countries and compare
them to relevant benchmarks such as the US (Figure 9 and Figure 10). US
federal government debt is much more skewed towards short-term maturities
compared with euro area countries. This may reflect a lower rollover risk faced
by the US federal government thanks to the role of lender of last resort or
backstop function performed by the Federal Reserve.58 E-bonds could perhaps
enjoy a similar backing from the ECB so their issuance could be skewed towards
short-term maturities — both in the transition phase, as a way to launch the
programme of common issuance, and in the steady state. Such a maturity
profile for E-bonds would respond to the motivation that led to the Eurobills
proposal. Combined with the issuance of longer term bonds, this would allow
the formation of a full euro area yield curve, which the Eurobills proposal did
not envisage.
58In the US, the Federal Reserve is seen by markets as a backstop or purchaser of last
resort in the market for US Treasuries. However, in the euro area, countries can no longer
rely on their own central bank to ultimately assist them in case of liquidity stress in the
market for sovereign bonds denominated in their own currency. Issuer limits and different
collateral haircuts apply to the provision of central bank liquidity to respect the prohibition
of monetary financing and to manage credit risk. The introduction of a euro area safe asset
with a supranational nature could help to overcome these limitations and enable a possible
role for the ECB as a lender of last resort via such an asset. See, for instance, Cœure´ (2016),
Constaˆncio (2019), Constaˆncio (2018) and Grauwe (2011).
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Figure 10: Implied maturity pattern of E-bonds, replicating the US federal debt profile
Note: the maturity distribution of US federal debt instruments is taken as a benchmark
to simulate the potential maturity distribution of E-bonds, based on the existing stock
of listed central government debt securities issued by euro area Member States as at
early 2019.
Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg data.
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In effect, issuing at shorter maturities could be attractive for many DMOs,
as national short-term markets are frequently too small and therefore entail
higher costs for issuers (this has become particularly the case in some Member
states given the lengthening of average maturities of sovereign bonds carried
out following the crisis).59 E-bonds focused on short-term maturities (E-bills)
could create a new, liquid market that could reduce debt placement costs in
primary markets. In addition, it is likely that E-bonds with short maturities
would satisfy unmet demand by foreign reserve managers and corporations.60
Equally, E-bonds skewed towards short-term maturities could become the
instrument of choice by banks for liquidity and collateral purposes, helping to
break the bank-sovereign nexus. Moreover, their political economy would be
more manageable, as differences in yields across Member States are usually
smaller for short-term maturities and the legal seniority of E-bonds would have
a lower market impact. This is because short-term liabilities, now towards the
common issuer, already have a chronological repayment priority over longer-
dated paper. At the same time, compared to issuing E-bills alone, issuing
longer-dated E-bonds would allow the creation of a full yield curve for the euro
area, with potential advantages.
Holdings of banks and other financial intermediaries
The previous sections have assessed the potential size of E-bond issuance, its
impact on national bond markets and the possible distribution of maturities
taking the US as a benchmark. The key takeaways are that issuance of E-bonds
of some 15-30% of GDP would be possible, that yields on national bonds would
rise, and that E-bonds could cover most of the short-term financing needs of
Member States. The next few paragraphs sketch out, in a partial equilibrium
framework, how this issuance could be absorbed within the financial system and
how that could impact the current concentration of risk from holding national
bonds.
Table 6 presents a simplified assessment of the possible reallocation effects of
introducing E-bonds on the composition of the sovereign exposures of banks, in-
surers and occupational pension funds. It is based on a total volume of E-bonds
outstanding of 15% of GDP (the lower bound of the 15-30% range considered
more easily implementable), which corresponds to about AC 1.7 trillion of E-
bonds. At the same time, the same amount of national bonds would no longer
be on the market. Assuming that banks, insurers and pension funds would
acquire all those E-bonds put in circulation, replacing their national holdings
which have matured, this would correspond to a reduction of 36% in their ex-
posures to national sovereigns.
If banks were to hold 36% of their sovereign exposures in E-bonds and keep
the geographical distribution of their remaining (now lower) exposures to na-
59See OECD (2019) and Association for Financial Markets in Europe (2017).
60See the survey in OMFIF (2019) covering global public investors, who expressed their wish
to buy more European safe assets and their interest in exploring the potential of a highly-liquid
common euro area safe asset.
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Table 6: Possible reduction in domestic sovereign exposures and home bias following
the introduction of E-bonds
Note: (*) a simplified financial system is assumed, where the total supply of E-bonds,
equivalent to 15% of euro area GDP, is entirely absorbed by banks, insurers and oc-
cupational pension funds; (**) remaining domestic national sovereign exposures over
other sovereign exposures, chosen to be equal to the current ratio of domestic sovereign
exposures over total sovereign exposures, expressed by (3)/(2) in the table - in other
words, it is assumed that the home bias in national (i.e. non-E-bond) sovereign expo-
sures does not change compared to the current situation; data on domestic sovereign
exposures was scaled up from a large, representative EBA sample, for consistency with
MFI aggregates.
Source: Own calculations, European Banking Authority, European Insurance and
Occupational Pensions Authority and ECB. Bank and insurance data refers to Q3-
2018. Occupational-pensions data refers to 2017.
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tional bonds unchanged (Scenario 1 in Table 6), domestic exposures would me-
chanically go down as a share of total assets, from their current 5.8% to 3.7%.
However, given the maturity mismatches inherent in their business model, banks
may prefer to hold a relatively larger share of their portfolios in E-Bonds, given
their liquidity, short term maturities and properties as collateral.61 For instance,
if banks were to end up holding 65% of their sovereign exposures in E-bonds,
their domestic exposures as a share of total assets would go further down to 2%
(Scenario 2).
An even stronger preference of the banking sector for E-Bonds would release
a larger share of national bonds onto the market, available to other investors.
These assets, with relatively longer maturities and higher returns, but still much
safer than equities, may attract the interest of life insurers and pension funds
looking for more attractive risk-adjusted returns over longer periods of time
to meet their liabilities.62 Scenario 2 in Table 6 assumes that insurers and
occupational pension funds would hold only 10% of their sovereign exposures
in E-bonds, and have the vast majority of their sovereign portfolio invested in
national sovereign bonds. This would still make their domestic exposures as a
share of total assets go down from 16% to 14%.
Overall, with the introduction of E-Bonds amounting to 15% of GDP, the
sovereign home bias of banks, insurers and pensions funds could be significantly
reduced. Importantly, this may happen without regulatory changes, assuming
preferences are aligned as described above. At the same time, the reduction in
home bias could be even stronger if banks would prefer to reduce their hold-
ings of domestic sovereign bonds more than non-domestic ones, which would
be the case in a more pan-European banking system, or with a policy or reg-
ulatory nudge. In any event, the introduction of a European safe asset with
the consequent reduction in overall national sovereign exposures, would make it
easier to implement possible regulatory changes, for example to avoid excessive
concentrations in the (few) banks where sovereign home bias might remain an
issue.
This partial analysis, which is presented for illustrative purposes, does not
consider fully the investment preferences of the different financial institutions,
nor possible shifts in demand that may take place not only within the euro area
but also internationally. It does reveal, however, the absorption potential for safe
61The current demand for “level 1” high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) for compliance with
regulatory requirements is estimated at approximately AC 2 trillion for euro area banks, which
should be compared to the AC 1.4 trillion which would be their holdings of E-Bonds under the
Scenario 2 in Table 6. Of the current demand for HQLA, approximately 40% can be met with
lower liquidity “level 2” assets. The remaining 60% has to be met with “level 1” assets such as
sovereign bonds, which is equivalent to approximately AC 2 trillion. Estimation derived using
ECB data. As no data for Germany is available, the average ratio of a HQLA over total assets
ratio observed for similar countries (i.e., a ratio of 15%) is used.
62There are arguments for why life insurers and pension funds could be expected to hold
significant amounts of higher yielding subordinated national bonds, as these institutions have
less leverage than the banking system, are more insulated from the short-term effects of price
volatility due to their hold-to-maturity strategies and their exposure to possible liquidity
outflows is significantly lower due to asset-liability matching, compared to possible runs in the
banking sector.
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assets and implications for holdings across different types of investors. Further
work is needed to ascertain the possible implications for investors’ demand.
8 Transition, extreme cases and incentives for
sound policies
Dealing with the transition
An important issue to consider is the transition to the new regime, with E-
bonds issued in the presence of legacy national bonds. To preserve current
bondholders’ portfolios and avoid unsettling markets, existing bonds should be
grandfathered, meaning that subordination would only apply to newly-issued
bonds. Also, the implied subordination rate for each country would be kept
constant during the transition.63 In practice, the target volume of E-bonds (the
same for all Member States, expressed as a share of GDP) would translate into
country-specific subordination rates. Taking Germany as an example, a target
volume of E-bonds of 15% of GDP would correspond to subordination rate of
roughly 72%.64 This means that 28% of eligible German general government
debt would gradually be transformed into E-bonds. When it comes to maturity,
for every AC 100 of German debt that are refinanced in the markets, 28% would
be refinanced through E-bonds issued by the common issuer and 72% through
junior national bonds issued by the German government. This way the sub-
ordination rate would be kept constant until the target volume of E-bonds is
reached.65 At the same time, this may imply a relatively long transition period,
in absence of actions to speed up this process, such as through offering swaps
to holders of grandfathered bonds.
Reflecting the grandfathering, repayment in the unlikely case of default dur-
ing the transition period would follow the sequencing explained in the following
example. Assuming AC 100 of total debt and that AC 60 are still in the form of
legacy pari-passu bonds, in the example of Germany the remaining AC 40 would
be split between AC 28.8 of national junior bonds and AC 11.2 of loans from the
E-bond issuer.66 In the event of a default with a general haircut of 30%, the
holders of the legacy pari-passu bonds would receive 70% of the face value (AC
42). The combined amount of E-bonds and junior bonds (AC 40) would likewise
suffer a haircut of 30% (AC 12). The remaining AC 28 would be used to pay first
the senior loans (AC 11.2). This would leave the holders of national junior bonds
with AC 16.8, implying an effective haircut of 41.6%. E-bond holders would thus
63For simplicity, it is assumed that the debt-to-GDP ratio of the country does not change
during the transition. Otherwise the subordination rate would be adjusted accordingly.
64Based on debt levels as at year-end 2017 and excluding non-central government loans from
an E-bonds scheme.
65It is also important to note that, relative to other proposals such as Accountability bonds
or Purple bonds, in the E-bonds model, junior national bonds would never be subordinated
to the whole stock of debt.
66Reflecting the subordination rate of 72%.
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Figure 11: Illustration of a default scenario during transition towards E-bonds
Note: example of the impact of a default in the transition phase, where only 40% of
the original stock has been rolled over, with the junior bond (with a subordination
rate of 72%) underpinning the seniority of loans received from the common issuer. As
the haircut is smaller than the subordination rate, the common issuer is repaid in full,
with junior bond holders suffering a larger loss, while holders of “old” grandfathered
bonds suffer a standard pari-passu haircut.
be fully protected by subordination and suffer no losses. This split is presented
in Figure 11.
Once a yield curve for E-bonds is created, the transition could be accelerated
to reach the target E-bond volume more quickly. For this purpose, the loans
from the common issuer to the Member States could be larger than their roll-over
needs. This additional funding could be used by DMOs to replace grandfathered
(pari-passu) bonds through a liability management exercise, for example by
offering a debt swap.67
An initial focus on short-term issuances could increase the market accep-
tance of E-bonds and offer a number of potential benefits in terms of costs for
DMOs, financial stability and several other aspects (Section 7). A successful
introduction of the common safe asset could lead to lower credit and liquidity
67The swap would respect the same subordination rate calculated initially for each Member
State. In the example of Germany. For each AC 100 of pari-passu central government debt
securities that are part of the swap, 28% would be refinanced through E-bonds and 72%
through junior national bonds.
43
premia as a result of the general equilibrium effects considered in Section 9,
which in turn could create room for a further increase in the average maturity
and the volume of E-bonds without adversely affecting Member States’ funding
costs.
Dealing with possible losses faced by the common issuer of
E-Bonds
To address the tail risk of losses on the senior loans, including for the unlikely
event that a haircut could be larger than assumed in our simulations or exceed
the subordination buffers considered in this paper, the common issuer could
be endowed with a capital buffer. The size of this buffer could be very small
for a volume of E-bonds below 20% of euro area GDP, in view of the limited
tail risks presented earlier (Section 5).68 This limited risk sharing in the form
of a common credit enhancement would benefit all Member States by lowering
the risk premia on E-bonds and appears compatible with Article 125 TFEU, as
suggested by the Pringle case on the capital buffer of the ESM.69 It would mean
that if ever a haircut is experienced on a senior loan, E-bond holders should
never incur any loss. At the same time, if tail risks would ever materialise, the
existence of a capital buffer would be preferable to a situation without such a
buffer where governments could end up in difficult discussions on whether and
how to cover the losses on the senior loans, not having defined this ex-ante.
One could consider several ways to build a capital cushion, which may be
complementary. One possibility would be for participating Member States to
transfer to the common issuer an amount equivalent to the profits accrued to
the Eurosystem from the Securities Market Programme (SMP) since its launch,
which are expected to amount to AC 72.6 billion.70 This would be consistent with
the fact that the SMP programme was enacted to ensure depth and liquidity in
malfunctioning segments of the debt securities markets, and that profits from
that operation could be further used for sheltering the euro area from those
risks, which is also one of the objectives of introducing a European safe as-
set. Another possibility, which would not entail any transfer from participating
Member States but rather build on the advantages from the common safe asset,
would be to accrue part of the initial benefits from the project to a capital buffer
68The capital buffer could be significantly smaller than suggested in Zettelmeyer and Lean-
dro (2018), given more favourable VaR results in this paper.
69In its Pringle Judgment, the European Court of Justice did not go along with the very
broad interpretations of Article 125 TFEU advocated by some parties. Instead, the only con-
structions that can be ruled out with certainty are those where: (i) Member States’ liabilities
are assumed by its peers, i.e. the Member State is (partially) freed of its relevant liabilities
due to a bail-out operation, an (ii) there is no mechanism to ensure (sufficiently strong) in-
centives for sound budgetary policies (see European Court of Justice (2012)). Conversely,
constructions that meet these two criteria could be judged compatible with the Treaty, which
potentially leaves room for a relatively large range of design options. At the same time, a
construction with higher degree of mutualisation is more likely to be incompatible with EU
Law, unless a suitable incentive mechanism is found to accompany it.
70See ECB (2019).
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by applying a markup on the pricing of the loans from the common issuer for a
given initial period. There are possibly other sources that could be envisaged.71
An additional tail risk is that a Member State would decide not to honour the
seniority of the loans and pay other claims first, despite the legal obligation and
the existence of a sufficient subordination buffer.72 This extreme case is relevant
not only for E-Bonds, but also for any other policies with financial implications
among Member States and relevant to the functioning of the EU.73 As long
as the Member State remains in the euro area and in the EU, there would be
substantive ways to exert pressure on it to comply with the full repayment of
the senior loans.74 If a Member State decides to voluntarily leave the EU, the
ongoing Brexit process shows that financial obligations would be an important
part of the exit negotiations.
Distribution, incentives and buffers
Both the transition and the steady state, depending on how they are managed,
could deliver some financial benefits for Member States, and also some cross-
subsidisation. The analysis by “Z-L” and the results presented in Table 5 show
that the volume of cross-subsidisation would be very small, yet the related
dynamics and incentives merit consideration.75
A possible way to address distribution effects and create appropriate incen-
tives possibly linked to the European economic governance framework would be
through an articulated pricing schedule for the senior loans in the steady state.
This could possibly include up to three components, (i) an administrative fee
to cover the operational costs of the common issuer, (ii) a capital-contribution
fee that would allow the gradual build-up of a buffer to cover tail risks, and (iii)
a withholding component that can only be distributed to Member States after
evidence that they comply with the regular multilateral surveillance and coor-
71One further possibility concerns gold reserves. The very creation of the euro and the
pooling of monetary sovereignty into the ECB have made the cumulated pre-existing stock of
gold reserves across EA countries in part redundant, as indicated when compared to what is
needed in other monetary unions such as the US to underpin the credibility of the monetary
policy. Accordingly, a tiny fraction of the excess in national gold reserves could also be devoted
by Member States (and/or national central banks) to support this project. Differently from
the transfer of SMP profits, it would probably not have a budgetary impact for Member
States.
72It important to clarify here that the seniority of loans would not apply with respect to
current obligations of the government such as to pay wages or pensions. To avoid any doubt
on this matter, this would need to be carefully spelled out in the legal texts underpinning the
construction.
73For instance, the legal obligations related to the functioning of the EMU and of the
Eurosystem.
74For example, any disbursement from the EU budget to that Member State could be
suspended because of the severe breach in the rule of law. It could also be envisaged that the
suspended EU budget allocation may be diverted to the repayment of the senior claims until
the latter is fully honoured, though this may require some legal changes.
75Table 5 shows that the average financing costs increase or decrease for some countries,
which can be seen as a measure of cross-subsidisation (in an partial equilibrium context).
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dination processes.76 The latter component, together with the stronger market
pressure,77 would provide a significant boost to the incentives for the conduct of
sound national fiscal policies. This could not only increase compliance with the
fiscal framework, but also possibly facilitate its simplification given that market
pressure needs to play a role, together with fiscal rules and institutions, in an
efficient and effective fiscal framework.
As a way to manage potential turbulence in national bond markets, it could
be envisaged that the cap set for the total E-bonds issuance foresees a buffer to
be used in exceptional times. For example, it could be decided that a cap for
E-bonds issuance is set at 20% of GDP, but actual issuance only reaches 15%
of GDP. This would provide a buffer of 5% of GDP that could be activated if
necessary in periods of stress when Member States may face temporary difficul-
ties in accessing markets. This would both reduce the amounts that Member
States would need to place directly on the market via national bonds, and boost
the supply of common safe assets at a moment when they are more demanded,
complementing any monetary policy action.
9 General equilibrium and dynamic effects
The previous sections presented results based on static simulations of shifts in
credit risk between two components of government debt, a part funded directly
on bond markets and a part funded via loans from a common issuer. As such,
credit risks are simply shifted from one component to the other, but the over-
all amount of risk is assumed to remain unchanged. However, several general
equilibrium effects are expected with the issuance of E-bonds, as soon as they
would reach a sufficient size. Further research could shed light on a number of
them, such as:
• By increasing marginal funding costs, E-bonds would improve the incen-
tives for prudent fiscal policies, thereby reducing the overall risks to the
sustainability of public finances in euro area countries over time. There
is evidence of euro area governments reacting to the marginal costs of
funding.78 Increasing the latter through subordination should therefore
improve fiscal outcomes. In addition, as explained later in this section,
76For example, in case of no-compliance with the EU rules for economic and fiscal coordina-
tion, the E-bond issuer would retain the withholding component of that country and assign it
to the capital buffer. Compliance should be established on the basis of the Union’s framework
for economic and fiscal coordination, without any duplication of surveillance processes, and
the transfer of the benefits could be done on an-ex post basis. The distribution of the profits
from the Agreement on Net Financial Assets to Greece in the post-programme environment
(as part of the debt-reducing measures adopted in 2018 by the Eurogroup) gives a useful
indication of the powerful incentives that such a solution could create. The grant of roughly
0.5% of GDP was transferred in Spring 2019 only after an ex-post assessment of Greece’s
compliance with its commitments, including the fiscal targets.
77Market pricing could become more consistent to the extent that the introduction of E-
bonds could reduce redenomination risks, and also deliver a stronger price signal on national
bonds (through higher marginal costs of funding).
78See Meyermans (2019).
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the pricing of the E-bonds could be established in a such a way as to
increase incentives to comply with the European economic coordination
and surveillance framework.
• The higher liquidity of the common safe asset (compared to national
bonds) could help harness a global liquidity premium advantage, currently
enjoyed mainly by US treasuries.79 At the same time, the liquidity of
shrinking national bond markets would need to be assessed and managed
to mitigate negative effects and identify possible synergies.80 There is
therefore a case for investigating the liquidity risk premia that E-bonds
could command and the counterfactual liquidity premia on remaining na-
tional bonds.
• The holding by the banking sector of a significant amount of suprana-
tional bonds would not only “statically” reduce exposures, as outlined
in Section 7, but could also avoid feedback loops and dangerous interac-
tions with uncertainties in national policies — which in the past have led
to asymmetric effects81 in the market pricing of bonds with respect to
fundamentals, possibly reflecting inter alia the appearance of redenomi-
nation risks. This could help to stabilise risk premia in times of stress
and possibly reduce the overall riskiness of European sovereigns. In turn,
this dynamic effect could offset the impact on marginal funding costs for
vulnerable countries of issuing higher volumes of E-bonds.
• Stronger financial stability, more predictable fiscal policies and more ef-
fective transmission of monetary policy could support higher investment
and potential growth. This could in turn have favourable effects on the
debt dynamics, via both the denominator and the numerator. As such,
debt levels could reduce faster for any given fiscal effort, improve the sus-
tainability of public finances, and further reduce credit risk, mitigating
the impact on marginal funding costs from subordination.
79ECB (2019) finds that: “Some euro area sovereigns enjoy an economically significant
’exorbitant privilege’ stemming from large holdings of foreign central banks relative to out-
standing euro area safe debt. As foreign central bank holdings of euro area government debt
are concentrated in a few euro area countries issuing debt that is seen as risk-free, the ’exorbi-
tant privilege’ can be interpreted as having contributed to widening intra-euro area sovereign
bond spreads. One ingredient for a stronger international role of the euro is to have a larger
supply of safe assets. This can, for instance, be achieved by maintaining or restoring sound
and sustainable fiscal policies throughout the euro area. In the longer term, the creation of a
common euro area safe asset, if so decided by Member States, in a way that does not under-
mine incentives for sound national fiscal policies, could also contribute to this objective. An
indirect benefit of a strong international role of the euro would be that the euro’s ’exorbitant
privilege’ would be more widely shared across euro area sovereigns.”
80While the total size of national bond markets would shrink, this does not necessarily mean
that liquidity would deteriorate to the same extent or at all. For instance, the existence of a
European yield curve could eliminate the need for at least some national DMOs to maintain
a national yield curve, allowing them to concentrate issuances on a few maturities. This
could reduce operational costs and result in larger ticket sizes and overall more liquid market
segments than is currently the case.
81See Monteiro and Vasˇ´ıcˇek (2019).
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10 Conclusions
Several arguments call for issuing a large and homogeneous European safe as-
set: it would reduce banks’ exposure to national sovereign bonds, support a
smooth and symmetric transmission of monetary policy, facilitate the comple-
tion of the Banking Union, creating a benchmark for the Capital Markets Union,
strengthen the international role of the euro and — in a construction such as
E-bonds — increase the incentives for sound national economic and budgetary
policies.
This paper makes several contributions. It reviews the modelling techniques
and underlying assumptions used in previous studies, based on the available
empirical evidence and a full sample of available time series for credit default
expectations. This leads to a choice of more conservative probabilities of default
and losses given default that are solidly grounded on the historical experience of
the euro area, on the available data on sovereign credit events and on industry
practice. Using this revised (fuller-evidence) assumptions, the paper recalculates
the credit risk implicit in national bonds, SBBS and E-bonds. The results
suggest that a higher degree of conservatism may be warranted as regards the
expected losses for the most creditworthy Member States, with the reverse being
true for the less creditworthy countries, compared to previous studies.
The paper also deepens the analysis on the capacity of the E-bonds model
to deliver a common safe asset for the euro area. Previous analyses, looking at
different approaches, suggest that E-Bonds have attractive features in terms of
safety, liquidity and incentives, while being compatible with the EU legal frame-
work. This paper proposes a streamlined construction for E-Bonds, which would
place Member States and their national debt management offices at the centre of
the governance and help to increase the political acceptance of the construction.
The credit risk simulations show that this streamlined E-bond construction –
without securitisation nor mutualisation – could achieve the needed scale and
creditworthiness to become the main safe asset in the euro area.
The paper also assesses quantitatively the impact of introducing E-bonds
on the remaining national bonds, which would continue to exist. The results
confirm that the introduction of E-bonds would – ceteris paribus – exert pressure
on national bond yields. Higher marginal funding costs would boost incentives
for more prudent fiscal policies. At the same time, average funding costs should
remain broadly unchanged, hence not impacting negatively on Member States’
debt sustainability prospects. This provides the basis for a possible calibration
of the size of the E-bonds scheme that balances various trade-offs. The potential
size of the E-bond issuance would be constrained not so much by the credit risk
of E-bonds themselves but by the wish to preserve the rating of current triple-
A issuers or to contain the increase in the marginal cost of funding for less
creditworthy sovereigns.
The paper also illustrates the potential impact of E-bonds on financial mar-
kets, in line with their goals. A comparison with the outstanding volumes of
debt securities issued by euro area countries shows that E-bonds could achieve
sufficient scale and safety – comparable to those of Member States with the
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highest credit rating – and become the main safe asset in the euro area. A
comparison with the maturity pattern of US sovereign debt shows, for example,
the potential for making E-bonds the main debt instrument in the euro area
for maturities of less than two years. Based on the current sovereign exposures
of banks, insurers and pension funds, illustrative scenarios show that E-bonds
could deliver a significant reduction in exposure to national sovereign risk as
well as in the degree of home bias.
Even at a lower bound of 15% of euro area GDP, and with an issuance
pattern focused on short-term maturities, E-bonds would already deliver im-
portant benefits for all participating Member States: (i) they would likely enjoy
a top credit quality, on some accounts possibly performing even better than the
German bund, whose triple-A credit rating would be preserved, (ii) incentives
for sounder policies would be created, as the marginal funding cost for high-
debt countries would increase moderately while average funding costs would
stay broadly constant, (iii) the volume and term structure would be sufficient
to generate a very liquid short term market, which is currently underdeveloped
in the euro area when compared to the US and (iv) they could become the ref-
erence safe asset for the banking sector and monetary policy operations in the
euro area.
The paper looks also at some operational questions, including (i) the tran-
sition towards the steady state, based on the grandfathering of existing debt
and an initial focus on short-term maturities to minimise risks, (ii) the need to
foresee extreme cases to reduce any uncertainty on possible implications for par-
ticipating Member States, and (iii) how to create further incentives for Member
States by possibly linking the issuance of E-Bonds with the European framework
for economic and budgetary coordination and surveillance.
Finally, the paper considers briefly some possible dynamic and general equi-
librium effects that could materialise from the stabilising properties of a common
safe asset of sufficient safety and size such as E-bonds: an improved transmis-
sion of monetary policy, stronger incentives for responsible fiscal (and other
economic) policies, lower scope for asymmetric behaviour of markets (including
from a closer alignment of bond prices with fundamentals and from a reduction
in redenomination risks), as well as the potential liquidity premia advantage
from a common safe asset of global relevance. Stronger financial stability and
better government policies could reduce risks in the euro area and support higher
investment and potential growth, which would improve the sustainability of
government finances, and reduce macroeconomic imbalances in self-reinforcing
dynamics.
There are several areas where further research seems warranted. This in-
cludes (i) exploring the behaviour of investors – both from within and outside
the euro area – in the face of the new characteristics (as regards, e.g., ticket sizes,
maturities and yields) of sovereign bonds supplied in Europe, (ii) identifying and
studying the general equilibrium effects referred to above, (iii) considering the
legal and operational aspects linked to any concrete introduction of a safe asset
in the form of E-bonds, and (iv) looking more closely at the political economy
aspects which appear critical for the success of such an endeavour.
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A Replicating the CDS-based calibration of Brun-
nermeier et al (2017)
The risk parameters used by “B-et-al”, specifically the PDs and LGDs for each
state of the economy shown in Table 7, are set in a relatively loose manner,
being subject only to monotonicity rules and consistency check between average
expected losses (or, possibly, expected PDs) and sovereign CDS data observed
in a particular month (December 2015).
This paper uses instead empirically-grounded assumptions for conducting an
assessment of sovereign credit risk. In order to employ the “B-et-al” method-
ology, a first exercise is to replicate the inference of the original parameters as
shown in Table 7.
Table 7: Credit risk parameters in Brunnermeier et al. (2017)
Source: Brunnermeier et al. (2017), own calculations.
When setting the credit risk parameters for their simulations, Brunnermeier
et al. (2017) seek to ensure a degree of consistency between their assumed ex-
pected losses (or, possibly, their assumed expected PDs) and sovereign CDSs
observed for December 2015. Replicating their CDS-based calibration is made
difficult by the unavailability of the original sources and some imprecise state-
ments:
1. It is unclear which was the original data source, CDS definition and finan-
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Figure 12: 5-year sovereign probabilities of default and expected losses (December
2015)
(a) Probabilities of default (b) Expected losses
Source: Brunnermeier et al. (2017), Bloomberg, own calculations.
cial formula (e.g., full or simplified) used to infer sovereign PDs. This is
because the authors rely on PDs inferred and published online by Deutsche
Bank (DB), based on CDS data for December 2015. As of 2019, DB no
longer publishes these PDs, and full information on the derivation details
required for replication is not available;
2. “B-et-al” state that DB assumes a “constant LGD rate of 40%” when
deriving the PDs, whereas a presentation by DB82 and an archived version
of the webpage83 show that DB rather assumes a conventional recovery
rate of 40% by default, and therefore a conventional LGD of 60%;
3. “B-et-al” select the parameters such that average default rates are “consis-
tent with market prices.” However, the authors’ default rates (i.e., PDs)
can only be compared to the default rates inferred by DB from market
prices (i.e., CDS) under the same assumptions for LGDs. This, however,
is not the case, in particular as the “B-et-al” LGDs are country-specific
(see Table 7), whereas DB’s LGDs are constant and set at conventional
levels.
Whether, and the extent to which, points 2. and 3. have an impact on the
calculation of the risk parameters is not immediately clear. Figure 12 compares
the 5-year PDs and expected losses of “B-et-al” with recalculated PDs and ex-
pected losses inferred via standard, simplified financial formulae84 from average
82See the online presentation by Deutsche Bank Research available from http:
//nzz-files-prod.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/files/4/1/2/cds+deutsche+
bank+161214_1.18446412.pdf.
83https://web.archive.org/web/20160316082947/http://www.dbresearch.com/servlet/
reweb2.ReWEB?rwnode=DBR_INTERNET_EN-PROD$EM&rwobj=CDS.calias&rwsite=DBR_INTERNET_
EN-PROD.
84I.e., ELi,t = PDi,t×LGDi,t, with PDi,t = 1−e
(−T×CDSi,t/LGDi,t), where T represents
the number of years of the CDS contract – 5, in our case – and LGD is set at a conventional
60%.
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CDS data for December 2015. The CDS data is taken from Bloomberg and is
based on the ISDA 2014 definitions.
Overall, the original PDs and ELs of “B-et-al” are relatively close to the
values we obtain. This is therefore a good indication that the results which we
present throughout the paper are essentially driven by the use of new underlying
assumptions, rather than by differences in methodology. It should be noted in
this regard that for Germany and for the Netherlands, “B-et-al” do not rely on
CDS-based calibration, which explains why the recalculated PDs and ELs are
noticeably higher (though still very low relative to other countries). Also, no
recalculated figures are reported for Luxembourg and Malta due to the absence
of CDS data for these countries.
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B Banks’ estimates of sovereign LGDs
Banks’ estimations of sovereign LGDs can vary significantly, but their average
value tends to be well below 65%, while estimates higher than this figure are
very unusual. This can be observed in Figure 13, which shows the results of a
2016 survey of banks following the “Advanced” IRB approach. In addition, a
survey of EU banks by the European Banking Authority focusing on low default
portfolios puts the maximum estimated sovereign LGD just below 60% in 2017.
However, the interquartile range was much lower, in the whereabouts of 27% to
45% (see Figure 14).
Figure 13: Distribution of banks’ sovereign LGD estimations
(a) Quorate (b) Non-quorate
Note: quorate refers to a smaller sample of multi-banked obligors and non-quorate to
a larger sample of single bank obligors.
Source: Credit Benchmark.
Figure 14: Distribution of banks’ sovereign LGD estimations in low default portfolios
in 2015 and 2017
Note: GG denotes general governments, IN denotes institutions and LC denotes large
companies.
Source: European Banking Authority.
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Table 8 presents information on sovereign LGD estimates, as disclosed by
a set of large banks domiciled in five different euro area jurisdictions. It can
be observed that average overall LGDs are, in all cases, well below 65%. By
inspecting LGDs per PD risk bucket, it can also be observed that (i) rarely
do average estimated LGDs exceed 65% and (ii) there is no clear correlation
between estimated PDs and LGDs.
Table 8: Average estimated sovereign LGDs per PD bucket for 5 large euro area banks
Note: some PD buckets contain only small, possibly undiversified, exposures, which
may explain large changes across buckets.
Source: Banks’ risk disclosure reports under Pillar 3 (2017).
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C Comparison of PDs and ELs in different states of the economy
Table 9 compares PDs and ELs under the “B-et-al” assumptions and under the recalculated full-sample figures, across the
three states of the economy. It is worth noting that, in three cases, Member States’ PDs do not increase with a severe euro
area recession when compared with a mild euro area recession. Therefore, monotonicity of country specific PDs over the states
of the euro area economy does not appear to be a universal empirical fact. This reflects the imperfect synchronization of the
national economic, fiscal and political cycles with respect to the overall European cycles.
Table 9: Comparison of PDs and ELs in different states of the economy
Source: Brunnermeier et al. (2017), own calculations.
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D Expected losses on national bonds per E-bond
issuance size under the “B-et-al” assumptions
Table 10: Expected losses on national bonds per E-bond issuance size under the “B-
et-al” assumptions
Note: a blank figure denotes a situation where the E-bond scheme size exceeds the
amount of eligible sovereign debt outstanding as of year-end 2017, so that no national
bonds are issued.
Source: Own calculations.
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E Simulation results under the adverse calibra-
tion
This appendix reproduces the simulation results under the adverse calibration
of Brunnermeier et al. (2017). In the adverse calibration, default correlations
across countries are driven not only by the common state of the euro area
economy but also by assuming increases in the PDs of other Member States in
the event of a default of Germany, France, Italy or Spain. Besides increasing
cross-country correlations, the implementation of the adverse scenario is such
as to increase the PDs and ELs of all euro area countries. This means that the
actual risk parameters underlying the simulations deviate from those shown in
Table 9, both for the “B-et-al” and the fuller-evidence assumptions used in this
paper. While the adverse calibration violates the law of total probability and
unhinges risk parameters from their empirical basis, it can be employed as a
stress test of the results presented in this paper.
The adverse calibration confirms that E-bonds remain safe at high issuance
levels, with safety ranges similar to those found under the benchmark calibra-
tion. In understanding this result, it should be noted that the adverse calibration
leads both to an upward shift in the ELs of E-bonds and in the EL of the safety
benchmarks. As expected, tail risks increase under the adverse calibration given
the stronger default correlation. However, the maximum possible losses remain
the same, as they are determined by the LGDs and the amounts of subordi-
nated debt. As with the benchmark calibration, tail risks remain contained
for issuance sizes up to 30% of GDP, and the VaR of E-bonds compares well
with that of the safest countries in the sample. The amount of safe assets that
can be created with an E-bonds scheme is likewise similar to the values based
on the benchmark calibration. The conclusion that average funding costs stay
broadly constant for most Member States, while decreasing markedly for low
debt countries, also holds when E-bonds represent 15% to 30% of GDP. Finally,
the safety level of ESBies is not always lower in the adverse calibration under
the fuller-evidence assumptions. However, as explained above, the adverse cal-
ibration partly overrides these assumptions, which means that this result for
SBBS should be read with caution.
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Figure 15: 5-year expected losses on ESBies and EJBies, per subordination level
(a) ESBies (b) EJBies
Source: Own calculations.
Figure 16: 5-year expected losses on E-bonds
Source: Own calculations.
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Figure 17: Value-at-risk of E-bonds per issuance size
Note: solid lines represent the VaR of E-Bonds, for different scheme sizes. The dashed
line represents the model-based VaR for Germany, for comparison purposes. The VaR
for the 0% quantile represents the maximum possible losses. Based on the fuller-
evidence assumptions.
Source: Own calculations.
Figure 18: Safe asset volumes per E-bond issuance size
Note: current amounts based on AAA sovereign bonds as of year end 2017 (that
is, issued by Germany, the Netherlands and Luxembourg); amounts under E-bonds
are based on Austria’s EL threshold; the dashed line shows the maximum achievable
amount if all remaining national debt can be subordinated to the loans from the central
issuer.
Source: Own calculations.
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Table 11: Expected losses on national bonds (in %) per E-bond issuance size (as a %
of GDP)
Note: based on the fuller-evidence assumptions; the last row shows the EL on E-bonds;
a blank figure denotes a situation where the E-bond scheme size exceeds the amount
of eligible sovereign debt outstanding as of year-end 2017, so that no national bonds
are issued.
Source: Own calculations.
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Table 12: Expected losses on national bonds per E-bond issuance size under the “B-
et-al” assumptions
Note: the last row shows the EL on E-bonds; a blank figure denotes a situation where
the E-bond scheme size exceeds the amount of eligible sovereign debt outstanding as
of year-end 2017, so that no national bonds are issued.
Source: Own calculations.
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Table 13: Increase in credit risk premia of national bonds (in bps) per E-bond issuance size (as a % of GDP of the euro area and each
Member State)
Note: based on the fuller-evidence assumptions; the first column shows the national (average) credit risk premia in the absence of E-
bonds; the last row shows the (average) credit risk premia on E-bonds; a blank figure denotes a situation where the E-bond scheme size
exceeds the amount of eligible sovereign debt as of year-end 2017, so that no national bonds are issued.
Source: Own calculations.
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Table 14: Changes in average credit risk premia on total government debt (in bps) per E-bond issuance size (as a % of GDP of the euro
area and each Member State)
Note: average credit risk premia on total government debt is the weighted average of the premia paid indirectly on E-bonds issuance
(via the senior loan) and of the premia paid on the remaining national debt (the junior part of which is show in Table 13). The first
column shows the national (average) credit risk premia in the absence of E-bonds. The columns show the average cost for the totality of
outstanding debt of a country for a given E-bonds issuance threshold. Risk premia on ineligible debt (i.e., non-central government loans)
is assumed not to change with respect to the situation of no E-bonds.
Source: Own calculations.
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